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Courts Don’t Follow:  Reasonable 
Compensation Rulings and the 
Exacto Spring Approach 
Beth Stetson, Alexis Downs, Evan Shough and Dana Blake  
INTRODUCTION 
The “reasonable compensation” issue is among the most 
frequently litigated tax issues.1  Its genesis is the Internal 
Revenue Service’s (“Service”) concern that, to avoid double 
taxation, closely-held corporations may unreasonably increase 
salaries to shareholder-employees rather than distributing 
dividends to them.2  The relevant statute, section 162 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (“Code”), allows taxpayers to deduct 
“ordinary and necessary expenses . . . including . . . a reasonable 
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services 
actually rendered.”3  Regulation 1.162-7(a) provides that 
deductible compensation payments must be both “reasonable” 
(“amount” test)4 and “purely for services” (“intent” test).5   
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 1 Andrew W. Stumpff, The Reasonable Compensation Rule, 19 VA. TAX REV. 371, 
372 n.4 (1999). 
 2 Lawrence R. Duthler, The Independent Investor Test: The Latest Test in the Search 
for Reasonable Compensation is Blurred in the Second Circuit, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1953, 
1955–56 (2000).  The issue of whether a payment represents deductible compensation (as 
opposed to, for example, a disguised nondeductible dividend) generally only arises when 
an employee is also an owner. Id. at 1955.  Currently, the federal corporate income tax 
rate varies between 15% and 39%, while the maximum individual rate is 35% for ordinary 
income and 15% for dividends.  If a payment is treated as dividend rather than 
compensation, the shareholder saving of 20% (35% – 15%) offsets somewhat the corporate 
loss of 15% to 39%.  For corporations with taxable income between $335,000 and $10 
million, the marginal rate is 34%.  For such corporations in tandem with their officers, the 
amount at issue is 14% (34% – 20%) of disputed compensation.  Thus, even though 
dividends are tax-favored at the individual level, compensation is still generally 
advantageous for a corporation and officer in tandem. Melanie G. McCoskey, Reasonable 
Compensation: Do You Know Where Your Circuit Stands?, 109 J. TAX’N 228, 228 (2008). 
 3 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2006). 
 4 Anne E. Moran, Reasonable Compensation, in TAX MANAGEMENT A-1, A-3 (Bureau 
of National Affairs, Portfolios Ser. No. 390-5th, 2011).  Courts rarely focus on the intent 
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The “amount” test is the usual battleground between 
taxpayers and the Service.6  Relevant thereto, Regulation 1.162-
7(b)(3) prescribes “[i]n any event the allowance for the 
compensation paid may not exceed what is reasonable under all 
the circumstances” and “[i]t is, in general, just to assume that 
reasonable and true compensation is only such amount as would 
ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like 
circumstances.”7 
Prior to Exacto Spring8 in 1999, courts generally used a 
“facts and circumstances” test with multiple objective factors to 
determine the amount of reasonable compensation, an approach 
consonant with section 162 and its regulations.9  In Exacto 
Spring, the Seventh Circuit alludes to the section 162 regulations 
only with respect to the “intent” test; and the court harshly 
criticizes the multiple objective factors analysis used by the Tax 
Court with respect to the “amount” test.10  The Seventh Circuit 
then turns to economic theory, opining that if a given amount of 
compensation leaves return on equity sufficient to satisfy an 
independent investor, then it is presumptively reasonable.11 
We believe Exacto Spring represents a legally improper and 
practically unwise departure from other reasonable 
compensation jurisprudence.  Below, we first explain that Exacto 
Spring overstates the judicial trend regarding use of an 
independent investor perspective and return on equity in 
reasonable compensation cases.  We then discuss Exacto Spring 
and other courts’ reluctance to follow its approach.  We then 
explicate the opinion’s (1) inconsonance with section 162, its 
regulations, and its other case law, (2) questionable behavioral 
assumptions, and (3) creation of more fodder for confusion than 
 
test. Id.; McCoskey, supra note 2, at 228.  Recently, courts have explicitly relied on the 
intent test in only two situations: (1) when a taxpayer attempts to re-characterize a 
payment as compensation, and (2) when a payment’s characterization as compensation 
does not comport with its substance. Moran, supra. 
 5 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a) (2011); Moran, supra note 4, at A-3.  Hereafter, unless 
otherwise indicated, reasonable compensation refers to the amount of reasonable 
compensation.   
 6 McCoskey, supra note 2, at 228–29. 
 7 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (2011).  Unlike regulations relating to some factual 
issues (for example, I.R.C. § 183 regulations), the I.R.C. § 162 regulations do not list 
specific factors courts should use to determine reasonable compensation. Treas. Reg. 
§§ 1.183-2(b), 1.162 (2011). 
 8 Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999).  Unless otherwise 
indicated, references herein to Exacto Spring are to the Seventh Circuit opinion.  
Hereafter, employee-shareholders whose compensation is at issue are referred to as the 
CEO (Chief Executive Officer) or officers.  
 9  Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7 (2011); see, e.g., Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 178 F.2d 115, 
119 (6th Cir. 1949); Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245–48 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 10 Exacto Spring, 196 F.3d at 835–37. 
 11 Id. at 839. 
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using multiple objective factors.  Finally, we offer a few of our 
own thoughts and suggestions.12 
Whether courts supplant current reasonable compensation 
jurisprudence with the Exacto Spring approach can be 
dispositive.13  Exacto Spring thus gives rise to a potentially 
outcome determinative split in approach between the circuits 
regarding one of the most frequently litigated tax issues.  
Supreme Court intervention would not be surprising, and 
additional discussion remains warranted.  
I.  EXACTO SPRING OVERSTATES THE JUDICIAL TREND REGARDING 
THE INDEPENDENT INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE AND RETURN  
ON EQUITY14 
Except for the Seventh Circuit in Exacto Spring and Menard, 
Inc. v. Commissioner,15 courts have used multiple objective 
factors to determine reasonable compensation.16  Although the 
sets of factors vary from circuit to circuit, they are similar.17  
 
 12 We are not the first to discuss the reasonable compensation issue recently. See, 
e.g., Jason L. Behrens, What Is Reasonable Compensation for Deduction Purposes? Two 
Tests Exist But Neither Paints a Clear Picture, as Evidenced in Devine Bros. v. 
Commissioner, 57 TAX LAW. 793 (2004); Heather L. Hathaway, Determining the 
Deductibility of Executive Compensation: Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 53 TAX 
LAW. 919 (2000); see generally Duthler, supra note 2. 
 13 Courts have both held compensation to be unreasonable despite return on equity 
sufficient to satisfy an independent investor and held compensation to be reasonable 
despite return on equity insufficient to satisfy an independent investor.  In Owensby & 
Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held the compensation therein 
unreasonable despite acknowledging the taxpayer’s return on equity compared favorably 
to that of comparable companies. Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Comm’r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 
29, 43–48 (1985).  The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Comm’r, 819 
F.2d 1315, 1334 (5th Cir. 1987).  It viewed the taxpayer’s return on equity of 212.5% and 
47.6% for the two years at issue as “impressive” and “far in excess of the return on equity 
of most comparable, publicly traded corporations” but rejected the taxpayer’s contention 
that this raised a “substantial presumption” the compensation was reasonable. Id. at 
1327.  In John L. Ginger Masonry, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held the 
compensation therein reasonable despite the taxpayer’s return on equity for the three 
years at issue of 1%, negative 13%, and 2%, for an average of negative 3.33% (return on 
equity for the previous five years averaged 45.2%). John L. Ginger Masonry, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2921, 2928–29 (1997).  The Tax Court justified its holding on 
two points.  First, the taxpayer’s masonry contracting business was affected by a 
“precipitous drop in the residential housing market” that began in the first year at issue. 
Id. at 2928.  Second, the officer “had foregone compensation in prior years in an attempt 
to enlarge [the taxpayer’s] capital base in order to satisfy the demands of the large 
developers.” Id. 
 14 We are not alone in many of our opinions expressed in this section. See, e.g., 
Hathaway, supra note 12, at 924–26. 
 15 Menard, Inc. v. Comm’r, 560 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 16 Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949).  Unless otherwise 
indicated, references herein to Mayson Manufacturing are to the Sixth Circuit opinion. 
 17 Duthler, supra note 2, at 1953. 
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Courts view no single factor as dispositive and weigh the totality 
of facts and circumstances.18  
The two most commonly used sets of factors are those set 
forth in Mayson Manufacturing Company v. Commissioner19 and 
Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner.20  Mayson Manufacturing set forth 
nine factors: (1) officer qualifications; (2) nature, extent, and 
scope of the officer’s work; (3) business size and complexity; (4) 
comparison of officer salary to business gross income and net 
income; (5) prevailing general economic conditions; (6) 
comparison of officer salary with distributions to stockholders; 
(7) prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions and 
comparable businesses; (8) taxpayer salary policy for all 
employees; and (9) prior compensation paid to the officer.21  
Elliotts set forth five factors: (1) officer role in the company, 
including position held, hours worked, and duties performed, as 
well as general importance of the officer to company success; (2) 
comparison of the officer’s salary with those paid by similar 
companies for similar services; (3) character and condition of the 
company, including its sales, net income, and capital value, as 
well as business complexity and general economic conditions; (4) 
potential conflicts of interest, including the independent investor 
standard; and (5) internal inconsistency in a company’s 
treatment of payments to employees.22  
In the 1949 Mayson Manufacturing case, one factor is 
comparison of officer salary with distributions to stockholders.23  
In the 1950s and 1960s, when addressing both the “intent” and 
“amount” tests, courts often looked to whether dividends had 
been paid.24  In 1970, the Court of Claims decided Charles 
McCandless Tile Service v. United States, which gave rise to the 
“automatic dividend” rule.25  Despite being generally profitable, 
the McCandless taxpayer had paid no dividends since its 
inception.  The Court of Claims found that, even though the 
compensation was reasonable in amount (satisfied the “amount” 
test), the failure to pay dividends indicated “any return on equity 
 
 18 Mayson, 178 F.2d at 119.   
 19 Id. 
 20 Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 1983).  Unless otherwise 
indicated, references herein to Elliotts are to the Ninth Circuit opinion. See also 
McCoskey, supra note 2, at 229–30. 
 21 Mayson, 178 F.2d at 119. 
 22 Elliotts, 716 F.2d at 1245–47. 
 23 Mayson, 178 F.2d at 119. 
 24 E.g., Pac. Grains, Inc. v. Comm’r, 399 F.2d 603, 606–07 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 25 Charles McCandless Tile Serv. v. United States, 422 F.2d 1336, 1339–40 (Ct. Cl. 
1970); Michael Q. Eagan, Reasonable Compensation and the Close Corporation: 
McCandless, the Automatic Dividend Rule, and the Dual Level Test, 26 STAN. L. REV. 441, 
445 (1974). 
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capital is so conspicuous by its absence as to indicate . . . the 
purported compensation payments necessarily contained a 
distribution of corporate earnings” (failed the “intent” test) and, 
therefore, disallowed the compensation deduction in the amount 
needed to leave a fifteen percent return on equity.26  In essence, 
McCandless imposed a “substance over form” analysis into the 
“intent” test. 
With respect to the “amount” test, in the 1970s courts began 
to speak occasionally in terms of the independent investor and 
return on equity, not just in terms of dividend payments.  For 
example, in 1974 in Edwin’s, Inc. v. United States, the Seventh 
Circuit noted the taxpayer’s profit exceeded twenty percent of 
invested capital.27  The previous year, in Charles Schneider & 
Company v. Commissioner28 and in Carole Accessories, Inc. v. 
Commissioner,29 and in 1980 in Cromer v. Commissioner,30 the 
Tax Court viewed failure to pay dividends as evidencing 
unreasonable compensation because independent investors would 
demand a return on their capital.  In 1981, in Foos v. 
Commissioner, the Tax Court viewed return on equity as one of 
twenty-one factors to be weighed in the “amount” test.31 
In Exacto Spring, to justify abandoning multiple objective 
factors, the Seventh Circuit characterized three previous circuit 
opinions as “moving toward a much simpler and more purposive 
test, the ‘independent investor’ test.”32  The first opinion, Elliotts, 
was issued by the Ninth Circuit in 1983.33  The second and third 
opinions, RAPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner34 and Dexsil Corporation 
v. Commissioner,35 were issued by the Second Circuit in the 
1990s.  All three opinions merely called for an examination as to 
whether return on equity would satisfy an independent investor 
as one of the “amount” test multiple objective factors.   
In Elliotts, the Ninth Circuit rejected the McCandless 
“automatic dividend” rule.36  The Court noted that dividend 
payment is not legally mandated and it may be in the best 
 
 26 McCandless, 422 F.2d at 1339–40.   
 27 Edwin’s, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 1974). 
 28 Charles Schneider & Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 555, 568 (1973). 
 29 Carole Accessories, Inc. v. Comm’r, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1285, 1290 (1973). 
 30 Cromer v. Comm’r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 701, 705 (1980). 
 31 Foos v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 863, 878–79 (1981). 
 32 Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 33 Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 34 RAPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 85 F.3d 950 (2d Cir. 1996).  Unless otherwise indicated, 
references herein to RAPCO are to the Second Circuit opinion.  
 35 Dexsil Corp. v. Comm’r, 147 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1998).  Unless otherwise indicated, 
references herein to Dexsil are to the Second Circuit opinion. 
 36 Elliotts, 716 F.2d at 1244. 
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interests of the company and shareholders for funds to be 
retained and reinvested in the company.37  The Ninth Circuit 
looked at each of the Elliotts factors.38  With respect to the 
“independent investor standard,” it stated as follows: 
[I]t is appropriate to evaluate the compensation payments from the 
perspective of a hypothetical independent shareholder.  If the bulk of 
the corporation’s earnings are being paid out in the form of 
compensation, so that the corporate profits, after payment of the 
compensation, do not represent a reasonable return on the 
shareholder’s equity in the corporation, then an independent 
shareholder would probably not approve of the compensation 
arrangement.  If, however, that is not the case, and the company’s 
earnings on equity remain at a level that would satisfy an 
independent investor, there is a strong indication that management is 
providing compensable services and that profits are not being 
siphoned out of the company disguised as salary.39 
The Ninth Circuit viewed the taxpayer’s average return on 
equity of twenty percent for the two years at issue as likely 
sufficient to satisfy an independent investor and held that the 
Tax Court erred by limiting its analysis to the taxpayer’s failure 
to pay dividends and remanded the case.40 
Since Elliotts, courts generally look to the viewpoint of the 
independent investor in reasonable compensation cases, but do so 
only with respect to the “amount” test.41  As long as the 
formalities of calling payments compensation are observed, 
courts hold the “intent” test to be met.42  After migration to the 
“amount” test, the viewpoint of the independent investor became 
just one of several factors and lost its potential trump power 
exercised in McCandless via the “intent” test.43 
In RAPCO, even though the taxpayer’s return on equity for 
the years at issue compared favorably to that of the Standard & 
Poor’s 500, the Tax Court sustained most of the compensation 
disallowance.44  The Second Circuit looked to the Elliotts factors 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 1245–48.  
 39 Id. at 1247. 
 40 Id. at 1247–48.  The Tax Court did not change its holding on remand.  However, it 
carefully crafted its explanations for not doing so from the viewpoint of a “hypothetical 
independent investor.”  For example, it reconsidered the taxpayer’s return on equity, but 
found it too low in comparison to comparable companies. Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm’r, 48 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1245, 1249–50 (1984), aff’d, 782 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 41 See RAPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 85 F.3d 950, 954–55 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 42 McCoskey, supra note 2, at 228; see, e.g., Dexsil Corp. v. Comm’r, 147 F.3d 96, 
100–01 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 43 Id. 
 44 RAPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2238, 2241 (1995), aff’d, 85 F.3d at 955–
56. 
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and affirmed.45  In response to the taxpayer’s argument that the 
Tax Court gave too little consideration to the effect its 
“impressive” return on equity would have on a “disinterested 
shareholder,” the Second Circuit noted that the Tax Court 
“explicitly conceded that [the taxpayer] had a substantial return 
on equity” but “correctly acknowledged . . . return on equity is 
only one factor”; and “the [Tax Court] appropriately discounted 
this factor, in the absence of evidence comparing [the taxpayer’s] 
return on equity to that of similar companies.”46  In Dexsil, 
although the Second Circuit held the Tax Court erroneously 
failed to consider the compensation at issue “from the perspective 
of an independent investor,”47 it clearly viewed all of the Elliotts 
factors as relevant.48 
After Elliotts, but prior to Exacto Spring, if reliable evidence 
regarding return on equity was available, the Tax Court 
generally viewed such evidence as indicative of reasonable 
compensation,49 while in a few cases, it viewed such evidence as 
indicating compensation was unreasonable.50  However, no court 
other than the Seventh Circuit has interpreted Elliotts, RAPCO, 
 
 45 RAPCO, 85 F.3d at 955–56. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Dexsil, 147 F.3d at 101, 103.  On remand, the Tax Court did not agree that an 
independent investor would be satisfied with a return on equity equal to that of major 
stock exchange companies, stating “[i]f that were the law, any amount of compensation 
would be regarded as reasonable as long as a minimal average return . . . was reflected on 
the company’s balance sheets.” Dexsil Corp. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1973, 1975 
(1999). 
 48 Dexsil, 147 F.3d at 100. 
 49 See, e.g., Webster Tool & Die, Inc. v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 86, 91 (1985); M. & 
E. Shindler, Inc. v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M (CCH) 3039, 3039–40 (1992); Auto. Inv. Dev., Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 57, 67 (1993); Mortex Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 2412, 2419 (1994); L & B Pipe & Supply Co. v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2798, 
2805–06 (1994); Universal Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 305, 314 (1994); 
Sunbelt Clothing Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 195, 197 (1997); Tricon Metals & 
Serv., Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 287, 292 (1997); Choate Constr. Co. v. Comm’r, 74 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1092, 1098 (1997).  Over this period, federal district courts looked to and 
used the “independent investor” test in a manner similar to the Tax Court. See, e.g., 
Trucks, Inc., v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 638, 647 (D. Neb. 1984), aff’d, 763 F.2d 339 
(8th Cir. 1985); Shaffstall Corp. v. United States, 639 F. Supp. 1041, 1047 (S.D. Ind. 
1986). 
 50 See, e.g., Donald Palmer Co. v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1869, 1872–73 (1995); H 
& A Int’l Jewelry, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 915, 922 (1997); LabelGraphics, Inc. 
v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 518, 527–28 (1998); Escrow Connection, Inc. v. Comm’r, 73 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1705, 1711 (1997).  In Alpha Medical, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 893, 901 (1997), the Tax Court held part of the claimed compensation unreasonable 
despite finding equity grew considerably during the CEO’s tenure and the year’s 98.65% 
return on equity was impressive.  The Sixth Circuit reversed and held the compensation 
reasonable, opining that the Tax Court placed insufficient emphasis on the favorable 
growth in equity and return on equity. Alpha Med., Inc. v. Comm’r, 172 F.3d 942, 949, 952 
(6th Cir. 1999). 
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or Dexsil as calling for abandoning the use of multiple objective 
factors.51 
II.  EXACTO SPRING AND OTHER COURTS’ RELUCTANCE TO  
FOLLOW ITS APPROACH 
A. Exacto Spring 
In Exacto Spring, the taxpayer, a manufacturer of precision 
springs, paid its chief executive (also cofounder and principal 
owner) $1.3 million in 1993 and $1 million in 1994.52  The Service 
contended that the proper compensation for these years was 
$381,000 and $400,000, respectively.53  Using a seven-factor 
objective test, the Tax Court held the proper compensation for 
the years at issue was $900,000 and $700,000, respectively.54  
The Seventh Circuit reversed and held that all of the 
compensation paid to the chief executive was reasonable.55   
The Seventh Circuit opined that using multiple objective 
factors “leaves much to be desired—being like many other multi-
factor tests, ‘redundant, incomplete, and unclear.’”56  The 
Seventh Circuit held this based on the following reasons: (1) “it is 
nondirective . . . [with] no indication . . . of how the factors are to 
be weighed . . . and many of the factors . . . are vague”; (2) “the 
factors do not bear a clear relation either to each other or to the 
primary purpose of section 162(a)(1)”; (3) it “invites the Tax 
Court to set itself up as a superpersonnel department for closely-
held corporations, a role unsuitable for courts”; (4) “it invites the 
making of arbitrary decisions based on uncanalized discretion or 
unprincipled rules of thumb”; and (5) “because the reaction of the 
Tax Court to a challenge to the deduction of executive 
compensation is unpredictable, corporations run unavoidable 
legal risks in determining a level of compensation that may be 
indispensable to the success of their business.”57  The Seventh 
Circuit used Exacto Spring to exemplify its views regarding the 
use of multiple objective factors,58 abandoning it in favor of an 
“indirect market test,” which is stated as follows: 
 
 51 Moran, supra note 4, at A-18. 
 52 Heitz v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2522, 2524 (1998), rev’d, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 
1999).  The trial court action involved two cases, which were consolidated, the other being 
Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner. Id. at 2522. 
 53 Id. at 2524. 
 54 Id. at 2528. 
 55 Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 833, 839 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 56 Id. at 835 (internal citation omitted). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 836–38. 
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A corporation can be conceptualized as a contract in which the owner 
of assets hires a person to manage them.  The owner pays the 
manager a salary and in exchange the manager works to increase the 
value of the assets that have been entrusted to his management; that 
increase can be expressed as a rate of return to the owner’s 
investment.  The higher the rate of return (adjusted for risk) that a 
manager can generate, the greater the salary he can command.  If the 
rate of return is extremely high, it will be difficult to prove that the 
manager is being overpaid, for it will be implausible that if he quit 
[because] his salary was cut, and he was replaced by a lower-paid 
manager, the owner would be better off; it would be killing the goose 
that lays the golden egg.  The Service’s expert believed that investors 
in a firm like Exacto would expect a 13 percent return on their 
investment.  Presumably they would be delighted with more.  They 
would be overjoyed to receive a return more than 50 percent greater 
than they expected—and 20 percent, the return that the Tax Court 
found that investors in Exacto had obtained, is more than 50 percent 
greater than the benchmark return of 13 percent. 
When, notwithstanding the CEO’s “exorbitant” salary (as it might 
appear to a judge or other modestly paid official), the investors in his 
company are obtaining a far higher return than they had any reason 
to expect, his salary is presumptively reasonable.  We say 
“presumptively” because we can imagine cases in which the return, 
though very high, is not due to the CEO’s exertions.  Suppose Exacto 
had been an unprofitable company that suddenly learned that its 
factory was sitting on an oil field, and when oil revenues started to 
pour in its owner raised his salary from $50,000 a year to $1.3 million. 
The presumption of reasonableness would be rebutted.  There is no 
suggestion of anything of that sort here and likewise no suggestion 
that Mr. Heitz was merely the titular chief executive and the company 
was actually run by someone else, which would be another basis for 
rebuttal.59 
B. Other Circuits and the Tax Court Decline to Follow  
Exacto Spring  
Between Exacto Spring and Menard, the Tax Court decided 
several reasonable compensation cases.  It did not adopt the 
Exacto Spring approach in any of these cases, despite 
considerable taxpayer prodding to do so.60  During the period, 
several circuits also declined to adopt the Exacto Spring 
approach despite considerable taxpayer prodding to do so.61   
 
 59 Id. at 838–39. 
 60 See McCoskey, supra note 2, at 237 (explaining how the Tax Court in Menard 
continued to apply the factors). 
 61 See id. at 230–38 (summarizing the current state of reasonable compensation 
jurisprudence).  
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In 2000, in Normandie Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, the Tax Court distinguished the case from Exacto 
Spring and looked to the RAPCO, Inc. factors from the 
perspective of an independent investor;62 the Second Circuit 
affirmed.63  In 2001, in Eberl’s Claim Service, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, the Tenth Circuit declined to abandon its 
“traditional multi-factor test of reasonableness outlined in Pepsi-
Cola Bottling”64 under which “the situation must be considered as 
a whole, with no one factor being decisive.”65  In 2003, the Tax 
Court used the Owensby & Kritikos66 factors to decide Brewer 
Quality Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner; the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed.67  In 2003, in E.J. Harrison & Sons, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s argument 
grounded in Exacto Spring that its favorable return on equity 
rendered compensation “presumptively reasonable”; the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed in relevant part.68  In 2003, in Haffner’s Service 
Stations, Inc. v. Commissioner, the First Circuit stated that the 
section 162 regulations require reasonableness to be based on “all 
circumstances” and rejected the taxpayer’s urging to adopt the 
Exacto Spring approach.69  In 2004, in Metro Leasing and 
Development Corp. v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit again 
declined to adopt the Exacto Spring approach and stated that 
courts should examine the “nature and quality of the services” an 
officer provides “as well as the effect of those services on the 
return the investor is seeing on his investment.”70 
C. Menard 
Menards is a retailer of hardware, building supplies, paint, 
garden equipment, and similar items.71  During the year at issue, 
the company had approximately 160 stores in nine Midwestern 
 
 62 Normandie Metal Fabricators v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1738, 1743 (2000). 
 63 Normandie Metal Fabricators v. Comm’r, 10 F. App’x 26 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 64 Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Salina, Inc. v. Comm’r, 528 F.2d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 
1975). 
 65 Eberl’s Claim Serv. v. Comm’r, 249 F.3d 994, 999 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pepsi-
Cola, 528 F.2d at 179).   
 66 Owensby & Kritikos v. Comm’r, 819 F.2d 1315, 1323 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 67 Brewer Quality Homes v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 29, 35 (2004), aff’d, 122 F. 
App’x 88 (5th Cir. 2004).  
 68 E.J. Harrison and Sons, Inc. v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 240, 252–53 (2003), 
aff’d, 138 F. App’x 994 (9th Cir. 2005).  The officer whose compensation was at issue was 
the mother of three other corporate officers.  The Tax Court found the taxpayer’s 
profitability to be attributable to the sons’ efforts and viewed this as strong evidence of 
intent to distribute profits to the mother in the guise of compensation. Id. at 253.  
 69 See Haffner’s Serv. Stations v. Comm’r, 326 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 70 Metro Leasing and Dev. Corp. v. Comm’r, 376 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Elliotts v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1983)).  
 71 Menard, Inc. v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 229, 231 (2004), aff’d, 560 F.3d 620 (7th 
Cir. 2009). 
Do Not Delete 11/18/2011 5:00 PM 
2011] Courts Don’t Follow 353 
states and was one of the nation’s top retail home improvement 
chains (third only to Home Depot and Lowe’s).72  That year, it 
paid its CEO $20,642,485.73  Because the case was appealable to 
the Seventh Circuit, the Tax Court was obligated to follow Exacto 
Spring or explain why it did not do so.74   
In its post-trial Tax Court brief, the Service conceded that 
the taxpayer’s return on equity for the year at issue would have 
satisfied an independent investor, and thus, the compensation 
passed the Exacto Spring “amount” test.75  The Tax Court refused 
to accept the concession on its terms, instead treating it as a 
concession that a presumption of reasonableness arose; a 
presumption rebuttable by evidence demonstrating the 
compensation “substantially exceeded . . . [that] paid by 
comparable publicly traded corporations to their CEO.”76  The 
Tax Court viewed the ability of such evidence to rebut the 
presumption of reasonableness as flowing from Regulation 1.162-
7(b)(3), which requires courts to consider “evidence of how the 
marketplace values the services of comparably situated 
executives”77 including “evidence of compensation paid to CEOs 
in comparable companies.”78 
Both parties’ experts accepted the Black-Scholes model as 
appropriate and agreed five publicly traded companies were 
comparable to the taxpayer: Home Depot, Kohl’s, Lowe’s, Staples, 
and Target.79  Because the taxpayer CEO’s compensation was 
multiple times higher than that of the comparable CEOs (two 
times the Target CEO, three times the Staples and Lowe’s CEO, 
four times the Kohl’s CEO, and seven times the Home Depot 
CEO), the Tax Court held that any presumption that the 
taxpayer CEO’s compensation was reasonable was rebutted.80  It 
then looked to the record as a whole to determine the amount of 
reasonable compensation.81  
 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 230.  
 74 See Lardas v. Comm’r, 99 T.C. 490, 494–95 (1992) (explaining that under the 
Golsen doctrine the Tax Court will follow “squarely on point” precedents of the Circuit to 
which appeal of its decision would lie).  
 75 Menard, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) at 238.  The Service relied solely on its “intent” test 
argument characterizing the disallowed compensation as a disguised dividend. 
 76 Id. at 238. 
 77 Id. at 238 n.34. 
 78 Id. at 239.  The Tax Court noted the Seventh Circuit did not discuss or declare the 
regulation invalid in Exacto Spring. Id. at 238. 
 79 Id. at 241. 
 80 Id. at 243. 
 81 Id. 
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The Tax Court viewed Home Depot and Lowe’s as most 
“directly comparable” to the taxpayer.82  It started with Home 
Depot CEO’s compensation of $2,841,307.  It multiplied this 
amount by 18.8% divided by 16.1%, because the taxpayer’s return 
on equity (18.8%) was higher than Home Depot’s (16.1%).  This 
yielded $3,317,799.  The Tax Court then multiplied that amount 
by 213%, because Lowe’s CEO’s compensation was 2.13 times 
higher than Home Depot’s CEO’s.  This yielded $7,066,912, 
which the Tax Court held to be the amount of reasonable 
compensation.83 
The Seventh Circuit reversed and held reasonable the entire 
amount the taxpayer characterized as compensation, 
$20,642,485.84  Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held the Tax 
Court committed clear error by holding that the reasonableness 
presumption was rebutted by evidence of comparable companies’ 
CEO compensation.85 
In the one Tax Court reasonable compensation case 
appealable to the Seventh Circuit since Menard, the Tax Court 
acknowledged that a sufficiently high rate of return could give 
rise to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness (although the 
rate of return therein did not suffice), while in the only other 
reasonable compensation case decided subsequent to Menard the 
Tax Court did not follow Exacto Spring and Menard.86  No circuit 
has addressed the reasonable compensation issue since Menard. 
 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 244.  The Tax Court also held that the CEO’s compensation failed the 
“intent” test and constituted a disguised dividend to the extent it exceeded $7,066,912.  It 
noted the taxpayer had never paid a dividend despite tremendous growth; the 
compensation was paid in a single five percent bonus lump sum rather than as services 
were performed; the compensation was profit-based (five percent of net income); the CEO 
agreed to reimburse the taxpayer if any portion of the compensation was disallowed; and 
the board of directors (all of whom were employees of the taxpayer or members of the 
CEO’s family or both) made no effort to ascertain the market value of compensation paid 
to CEOs of comparable companies or to periodically evaluate the taxpayer’s compensation 
formula. Id. at 244–45.  
 84 Menard v. Comm’r, 560 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 85 Id. at 625–28.  In the words of the Seventh Circuit, “[t]here is no suggestion that 
any of the shareholders were disappointed that the company obtained a rate of return of 
‘only’ 18.8 percent or that the company’s success in that year or any year has been due to 
windfall factors, such as the discovery of oil under the company’s headquarters.” Id. at 
624.  The Seventh Circuit also overruled the Tax Court’s disguised dividend holding. Id. 
at 625. 
 86 See Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co., LTD. v. Comm’r, T.C. Mem. 2011-74 
(Mar. 31, 2011); Multi-Pak Corp. v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1567, 1570 (2010) (applying 
the Elliotts factors). 
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III.  EXACTO SPRING IS INCONSONANT WITH SECTION 162, ITS 
REGULATIONS AND ITS OTHER CASE LAW 
A. Exacto Spring Is Inconsonant with Section 162 
Scholars have identified four methods of statutory 
interpretation used by courts: intentionalism, purposivism, 
textualism, and the dynamic method.87  According to 
intentionalism, even if statutory language appears clear, courts 
should examine legislative history to discern what the enacting 
legislature intended the statute to mean.88  That is, courts should 
essentially act as agents of the enacting legislature.  According to 
purposivism, courts should discern a statute’s original purpose by 
examining legislative history in the context of enactment 
circumstances.89  According to textualism, courts should not look 
to a statute’s legislative history but rather to its text in the 
context of surrounding law.90  According to the dynamic method, 
courts should look not only to a statute’s text and historical 
background but also to society’s contemporary needs and goals.91 
In 1934 in Gregory v. Helvering, the Second Circuit refused 
to give tax recognition to a transaction that literally complied 
with the Code but in its view was not what the statute intended; 
the Supreme Court affirmed.92  Since then, courts construing the 
Code most often speak in terms of intentionalism and 
purposivism.93  However, there are a few cases which best fit into 
the dynamic method mold,94 and recently some judges, including 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, have argued for and 
applied textualism.95 
 
 87 Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. 
TAX REV. 1, 7 (2004); see generally Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, “Purposivism,” 
and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996); Deborah A. Geier, 
Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492 (1995) (discussing 
how purpose aids in interpreting the Tax Code).  
 88 Cunningham, supra note 87, at 7–8. 
 89 Id. at 8. 
 90 Id. at 8–9. 
 91 Id. at 9–10.  See also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory 
Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 357–58 (1989) (“The new theories of statutory 
interpretation urge courts to consider, among other factors, a reading of the statute that 
meets the needs of present day society and best fits society’s current moral, social, and 
legal fabric.”). 
 92 Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810–11 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465, 470 
(1935). 
 93 Cunningham, supra note 87, at 12. 
 94 C.f. Livingston, supra note 87, at 699 (discussing Bob Jones University v. United 
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)). 
 95 Id. at 682. 
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No matter which method of statutory interpretation courts 
employ, the starting point is the statute’s text.96  Section 162 
provides: “[T]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary 
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year 
in carrying on any trade or business, including . . . a reasonable 
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services 
actually rendered.”97 
i.  Intentionalism and Purposivism 
Intentionalism and purposivism look to legislative history 
and historical background.  The Revenue Acts of 1913 and 1916 
contained only the general “ordinary and necessary” provision of 
section 162’s predecessor.98  However, underlying regulations 
warned of the need to analyze carefully purported compensation 
payments to officers to ensure such payments were not out of 
proportion to business volume or excessive when compared to 
similarly situated employees in other companies; the regulations 
prescribed “the amount so paid in excess of reasonable 
compensation for the services will not be deductible from gross 
income, but will be treated as a distribution of profits.”99 
The Revenue Act of 1918 added the “reasonable allowance 
for salaries or other compensation” provision.100  Its legislative 
history is unclear.101  According to some commentators, the 
provision “permit[ted] closely held enterprises to deduct an 
allowance for services rendered by officers and proprietors in 
computing the World War I excess profits tax even if no salary 
was actually paid.”102  In any event, after the excess profits tax 
expired, the provision came to be interpreted as a disallowance of 
unreasonable amounts if paid, rather than as an allowance for 
reasonable amounts that were not paid.103  By 1930, the Supreme 
Court implicitly acknowledged such a view in Lucas v. Ox Fibre 
Brush Co.,104 and since then the “reasonable allowance” provision 
 
 96 Cunningham, supra note 87, at 10. 
 97 I.R.C. § 162 (1996). 
 98 Moran, supra note 4, at A-1. 
 99 Id. at A-2.  See also Barbara F. Sikon, The Recharacterization of Unreasonable 
Compensation: An Equitable Mandate, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 306 (2004). 
 100 Moran, supra note 4, at A-1. 
 101 Id. at A-1.  See also Sikon, supra note 99, at 306. 
 102 BORIS BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES 
AND GIFTS ¶ 22.2.1 at 22-18 (3d ed. 1999). See also Moran, supra note 4, at A-1; Sikon, 
supra note 99, at 306. 
 103 Moran, supra note 4, at A-2; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 102, at ¶ 22.2.1, 22-
18. 
 104 Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115, 119 (1930). 
Do Not Delete 11/18/2011 5:00 PM 
2011] Courts Don’t Follow 357 
has functioned as a limitation rather than an enlargement of 
compensation deductibility.105  
While little in the way of intent or purpose can be gleaned 
from the unusual history of the “reasonable allowance” provision, 
eighty years of Congressional silence since Lucas evidences its 
assent to the facts and circumstances analysis of Regulation 
1.162-7 and multiple objective factors case law.  When Congress 
re-enacts a statute with administrative or judicial interpretative 
guidance in place, Congress is deemed to give assent to such 
guidance.106  The “reasonable allowance” provision with 
underlying regulations and multiple objective factors case law 
was in place during the 1954 and 1986 Code re-codifications,107 
and if Congress had been unhappy with these interpretations, 
presumably it would not have implicitly blessed them by re-
enacting the provision verbatim.108 
In sum, while legislative history and historical background 
are murky, Congressional re-enactment of section 162 while 
Regulation 1.162-7 and multiple objective factors case law were 
in place evidence Congressional approval of these 
interpretations. 
ii.  Textualism 
Textualism looks to a statute’s text and surrounding law.109  
With respect to text, the amorphous phrase “reasonable 
allowance” evidences Congressional intent to sentence taxpayers, 
the Service, and courts to messy facts and circumstances analysis 
in reasonable compensation controversies.  Congress imposes 
many such sentences in the Code: for example, determining 
whether an activity is engaged in for profit (section 183); 
determining whether related party transactions are at arm’s 
length (section 482); and computing reasonable capital needs of a 
business for purposes of the accumulated earnings tax (section 
531).110  When Congress wants to have a characterization 
 
 105 Moran, supra note 4, at A-1; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 102, at ¶ 22.2.1, 22-
18. 
 106 Lorillard, A Div. of Loew’s Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–82 (1978). 
 107 I.R.C. preface § 1 (2006); BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 102, at ¶ 22.2.1. 
 108 Analogously, a recent law review article observes that regarding I.R.C. § 482 “[b]y 
enacting and repeatedly reenacting section 482 and its predecessors, Congress has 
affirmed its initial decision to confront the problem of abusive transfer pricing, not with 
precise statutory formulae or hosts of special accounting rules, but with a generic 
standard heavily reliant upon the Commissioner’s exercise of discretion.” Francis M. 
Allegra, Section 482: Mapping the Contours of the Abuse of Discretion Standard of 
Judicial Review, 13 VA. TAX REV. 423, 444 (1994). 
 109 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621 (1990). 
 110 I.R.C. §§ 183, 482, 531, and other such sentences abound in areas of the law other 
than tax law.  As noted by Moran, supra note 4, at A-3, “[t]he concept [of reasonableness 
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question settled by a bright line test, it knows how to do so: for 
example, the material participation test under the passive loss 
rules (section 469); the definition of alimony (section 71); and the 
definition of passive gains under subchapter S (section 1375).111  
But in section 162 Congress decided against a bright line for 
reasonable compensation. 
With respect to context, courts have held a “reasonable in 
amount” limitation inherent in the section 162 “ordinary and 
necessary” provision,112 and section 482 grants the Service 
discretion to reallocate income and deductions among related 
parties to reflect an arm’s length standard.113  These provisions 
reflect the recurrent tax law theme of ensuring related party 
transactions are treated for tax purposes as if they had occurred 
between unrelated parties.114  Determining the amount a 
taxpayer would have paid an unrelated party for the same goods 
and services entails a facts and circumstances test very akin to 
the reasonable compensation determination approach of 
Regulation 1.162-7 and multiple objective factors case law. 
In sum, the amorphous language of section 162 coupled with 
the contextual tax law theme regarding related party 
transactions evidences that Regulation 1.162-7 and multiple 
objective factors case law are proper interpretations of section 
162.  
iii.  Dynamic Method 
The dynamic interpretative approach looks to society’s 
contemporary needs and goals.  According to the Seventh Circuit, 
a simpler, bright line test is needed to determine reasonable 
compensation.115  As discussed below, the Exacto Spring 
approach increases rather than decreases the complexity of 
reasonable compensation controversies. 
Even if the Exacto Spring approach did reduce complexity, 
such simplicity might come at too high a price.  To some extent, 
the “rules” approach of Exacto Spring versus the “principles” 
approach of multiple objective factors reflects the “rules versus 
principles” debate now ongoing with respect to both tax law and 
 
for compensation] defies simple interpretation by tax experts in the same manner that the 
hypothetical reasonable man escapes precise definition by negligence lawyers and the 
concept of reasonable doubt remains an elusive factor in criminal law.” 
 111 I.R.C. § 469(c)(4) (2006); I.R.C. § 71(b)(1) (2006); I.R.C. § 1375(b) (2006). 
 112 Noyce v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 670, 687–88 (1991); see also Comm’r v. Lincoln Electric 
Co., 176 F.2d 815, 817–18 (6th Cir. 1949). 
 113 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 102, at ¶ 4.3.3; Allegra, supra note 108, at 429–31. 
 114 ROBERT COLE, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. TRANSFER PRICING § 24.01 (Matthew 
Bender ed., 3d ed. 2011).  
 115 Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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financial accounting.116  It is perhaps overly simple, but not 
inaccurate, to summarize this debate as revealing there are 
advantages and disadvantages for both rules and principles for 
most applications.  Policymakers must pick their poison.117 
To recap, intentionalism, purposivism, textualism, and 
dynamic statutory interpretation all indicate courts should not 
abandon using multiple objective factors in favor of the Exacto 
Spring approach in reasonable compensation cases.  
Furthermore, in the absence of statutory language to the 
contrary or a compelling public policy reason, tax statutes should 
be construed without presumption.118  In Exacto Spring, the 
Seventh Circuit attempts to coin a presumption that 
compensation is reasonable if it leaves sufficient return on 
equity.119  As is apparent herein, neither the text of section 162 
nor its related policy concerns warrant such a presumption. 
B. Exacto Spring is Inconsonant with Section 162 Regulations 
The relevant section 162 regulations were promulgated 
pursuant to section 7805(a), which authorizes the Treasury 
Department to promulgate regulations interpreting the Code.120  
In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. 
United States, the Supreme Court recently held that such 
regulations must be followed if they represent a “reasonable 
interpretation” of the relevant Code section.121  
 
 116 See Tracy Stetson, Rules Versus Principles: Accountants’ Cognitive Styles and 
Professional Penalties, 67:12 J. PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE 115, 118 (2007).   
 117 See generally Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral Evidence on the Effects of Principles—
and Rules-Based Standards, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 91 (2003); see, e.g., John A. Miller, 
Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of 
Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993) (“[T]ax law is a system of rules that depends on 
constant and creative adaptation to meet changing circumstances” and “these themes 
argue for an approach toward tax rule making that is less concerned with details and 
more concerned with establishing fair general principles.”).  When Congress has 
considered using a mechanical approach for transfer pricing, seasoned members of the tax 
bar such as Sheldon Cohen (former Service Commissioner) have pointed out that, while 
the simplicity of such an approach is inviting, “fixed rates or formulas could produce 
arbitrary and unreasonable results.” Sheldon S. Cohen, How the IRS Intends to 
Administer the New Regulations Under Section 482, 28 J. TAX’N 73, 73 (1968). 
 118 Peter A. Lowy & Juan F. Vasquez, Jr., Interpreting Tax Statutes: When Are 
Statutory Presumptions Justified?, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 389, 393 (2004). 
 119 Exacto Spring, 196 F.3d at 837–38. 
 120 28 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2006). 
 121 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).  
In Mayo Foundation the Supreme Court held that generally courts must use the two-step 
analysis of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984), when evaluating the validity of Treasury Regulations issued under I.R.C. 
§ 7805(a).  Simply stated, under this analysis: (1) if the intent of Congress is clear, courts 
must give effect to this intent, but (2) if a statute is silent or ambiguous, relevant 
regulations must be upheld unless they are arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to 
the statute. 
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Again, Regulation 1.162-7(b)(3) prescribes that “[i]n any 
event the allowance for the compensation paid may not exceed 
what is reasonable under all the circumstances” and that “[i]t is, 
in general, just to assume that reasonable and true compensation 
is only such amount as would ordinarily be paid for like services 
by like enterprises under like circumstances.”122  The Seventh 
Circuit does not mention the regulation in Exacto Spring.  In 
Menard, it dismisses the regulation as “not an operational 
standard,”123 but cites no authority to justify ignoring regulations 
for such a reason.  We are aware of no case in which a party (or a 
court) challenged Regulation 1.162-7 as not representing 
reasonable statutory interpretation or as inconsonant with 
Congressional intent.  Even if the Exacto Spring approach is a 
“better” or even the “best” approach to determining reasonable 
compensation, it is legally improper for the Seventh Circuit to 
substitute such approach for that of Regulation 1.162-7.124 
One can view Exacto Spring as consonant with Regulation 
1.162-7 if one believes company owners actually determine officer 
compensation by looking solely to return on equity.125  Empirical 
studies indicate company owners consider much more than 
return on equity.  For example, one survey of 587 firms indicates 
that only four percent of firms relied exclusively on return on 
equity.126  To reduce the myopic behavior that specific metrics 
may cause, most firms use multiple metrics, including various 
ratios, income and revenue targets, and non-financial measures 
such as quality and innovation.127  Further, many reputable 
scholars question the behavioral assumptions of Law and 
Economics theory, upon which Exacto Spring is based.128   
 
 122 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (1960). 
 123 Menard, Inc. v. Comm’r, 560 F.3d 620, 622 (7th Cir. 2009).  
 124 See David A. Brennen, Treasury Regulations and Judicial Deference in the Post-
Chevron Era, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 395 (1997).  Other law review articles agree with 
our view that Exacto Spring and Menard are inconsonant with applicable regulations. 
See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 12, at 927.  
 125 The Seventh Circuit cited no empirical evidence to this effect.  A recent law review 
article notes, “[i]n the absence of empirical studies, [Posner] frequently engages in 
common sense speculation about potential consequences of particular decisions.” Linda E. 
Fisher, Pragmatism Is as Pragmatism Does: Of Posner, Public Policy and Empirical 
Reality, 31 N.M. L. REV. 455, 470 (2001).   
 126 Linda Amuso & David Knopping, Incentive Compensation Program Design, in THE 
COMPENSATION HANDBOOK 205, 211 (5th ed. 2008). 
 127 Id. at 209–10. 
 128 See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics After 
Behavioral Economics, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 
(1998); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1551 (1998); Adam Chodorow, Economic Analysis in Judicial Decision Making—
An Assessment Based on Judge Posner’s Tax Decisions, 25 VA. TAX REV. 67 (2005); Russell 
B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
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In sum, the Seventh Circuit’s lack of deference to Regulation 
1.162-7 in favor of Law and Economics theory is not legally 
proper.  Because taxpayers’ trust in and deference to Treasury 
Regulations is grounded in the expectation that courts will follow 
them, such judicial refusal to follow Treasury regulations may 
have negative consequences.129 
C. Exacto Spring Is Inconsonant with Other Section 162  
Case Law 
Judge Posner, author of Exacto Spring and Menard, has 
criticized use of multiple factors and reversed trial courts’ use of 
such analysis in a number of legal contexts;130 he has imposed 
standards derived from his economic theory in lieu of established 
legal standards in several cases across varied areas of the law.131  
Discussion of the propriety of this practice by Judge Posner, in 
general, is beyond the scope of this article.  However, in our 
opinion, even if such practice might be appropriate in some areas 
of the law, it is not appropriate with respect to reasonable 
compensation jurisprudence.  
 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Fisher, supra note 
125.  Exploration of Law and Economics theory is beyond the scope of this article.  In 
short, it posits humans as rational creatures seeking to maximize their satisfaction by 
making choices and weighing costs and benefits of alternative courses of action.  For an 
introductory discussion, we recommend Chapter 5 “Law and Economics” in JEFFRIE G. 
MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
JURISPRUDENCE 181 (Revised ed. 1989). See also Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern Economic 
Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic Visions of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 
193 (1998); Chodorow, supra.  Fisher, supra note 125, has many positive things to say 
about Judge Posner’s jurisprudence but argues that “at times, Judge Posner acts like a 
chancellor in equity, independently adjudicating facts and sometimes ignoring settled 
law, rather than as an appellate judge reviewing lower court decisions.” Id. at 458.  
 129 Brennen, supra note 124, at 388–89, notes as follows: 
Without question, the federal tax code is the most technical and complex of all 
federal statutory schemes.  Given this level of complexity, the Treasury 
Department, as the agency charged with administering the tax laws, must 
provide seemingly endless guidance to the public on how to comply with these 
laws.  Because they are often regarded as equivalent to statutory law, valid 
Treasury regulations are the most important form of Treasury guidance.  
Treasury regulations—both legislative and interpretive—are the most formal 
type of Treasury guidance and are clothed with congressional delegatory 
authority.  To the extent that these regulations are respected by reviewing 
courts, the public is assured that compliance with them is the same as 
complying with the related federal statute.  However, if reviewing courts refuse 
to defer to Treasury regulatory interpretations of tax statutes, public 
confidence in the Treasury is damaged, as is its ability to administer the tax 
laws.  Conceivably, this increases the likelihood that taxpayers will challenge 
Treasury regulations in court. 
 130 Chodorow, supra note 128, at 92 n.65.  
 131 C.f. id. at 68 (“Although often promoted as a tool to be used by policy makers, 
scholars have argued that judges either are or should be guided by economic principles 
when deciding cases.”).  
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Stare decisis, Latin for “let the decision stand,” is a bedrock 
principle of common law.132  It provides that, absent powerful 
justification, courts should follow previous precedent.  In 
Edwin’s, Inc. v. United States, the Seventh Circuit had previously 
determined reasonable compensation using multiple objective 
factors.133  Thus, Exacto Spring deviates from stare decisis.   
Stare decisis reflects two key policy concerns.134  First, 
judicial decisions only provide guidance to citizens structuring 
their affairs and to litigants preparing for trial if courts follow 
them.135  Second, respecting previous judicial decisions allows 
law to develop incrementally.136  Once Exacto Spring was on the 
books, the first policy concern was ameliorated in the Seventh 
Circuit, but remains germane for other courts. 
Regarding the second policy concern, when the Seventh 
Circuit issued Exacto Spring, courts had been wrestling with 
reasonable compensation for around seventy years.137  The Tax 
Court had penned several dozen opinions regarding the issue, 
and most Circuits had dealt with the issue a number of times.138  
While courts may have differed slightly regarding the factors 
they applied, they had reached a consensus that (1) section 162 
and its underlying regulations give rise to a dual subjective 
“intent” test and objective “amount” test, and (2) the “amount” 
test should be implemented using multiple objective factors.139  
Judge Posner is quite knowledgeable regarding tax law.140  
However, no amount of technical knowledge can replace the 
collective practical wisdom of Tax Court judges.  They typically 
practice tax law for decades in private practice, government 
service, or both prior to their court appointment.141  Upon 
 
 132 Kenneth J. Schmier & Michael K. Schmier, Has Anyone Noticed the Judiciary’s 
Abandonment of Stare Decisis?, 7 LAW & SOC. CHALLENGES 233, 234–35 (2005).  
 133 Edwin’s, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 1974). 
 134 Reasons courts should respect the views of predecessors include: (1) efficiency, (2) 
humility, (3) equal treatment, and (4) “only by following the reasoning of previous 
decisions can courts provide guidance for the future . . . .” Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of 
Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1177–79 (2006); see also Earl 
Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 368–72 (1988). 
 135 Maltz, supra note 134, at 328. 
 136 Id. at 371–72. 
 137 See, e.g., Tumwater Lumber Mills Co. v. Comm’r, 65 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1933). 
 138 See, e.g., Dexsil Corp. v. Comm’r, 147 F.3d 96, 96 (2d Cir. 1998); Owensby & 
Kritikos, Inc. v. Comm’r, 819 F.2d 1315, 1315 (5th Cir. 1987); Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm’r, 716 
F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1983); Edwin’s, Inc. v. Comm’r, 501 F.2d 675, 675 (7th Cir. 
1974); Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 178 F.2d 115, 115 (6th Cir. 1949). 
 139 Dexsil, 147 F.3d at 100. 
 140 Chodorow, supra note 128, at 72. 
 141 David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 17, 24 (1995). 
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appointment, they serve fifteen year terms,142 during which they 
typically preside over several cases involving reasonable 
compensation and other valuation issues.143  Tax Court expertise 
is so well recognized that many scholars argue its legal tax 
interpretations should be afforded a heightened standard of 
review.144 
In sum, when the Seventh Circuit issued Exacto Spring, 
adequate reasons were not extant to abandon multiple objective 
factors analysis, which reflected the collective practical wisdom of 
dozens of Tax Court judges and had been uniformly followed in 
all circuits (including the Seventh). 
IV.  EXACTO SPRING IS GROUNDED UPON QUESTIONABLE 
BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Exacto Spring ignores a multitude of social science theories 
that potentially are as equally applicable as Law and Economics.  
In Menard, Judge Posner focused on the risk inherent in Mr. 
Menard’s compensation,145 and clearly, an economic theoretical 
framework informed Posner’s perspective.146  In a recent article 
in the Journal of Institutional Economics, Posner explains this 
perspective.147  He states: “[O]rganization economics emphasizes 
the relation between organizational structure and compensation 
systems, on the one hand, and innovation, the management of 
information flows, agency costs, and efficiency in general, on the 
other hand.”148  The Journal article articulates Posner’s keen 
endorsement of organization economics and his support for the 
Law and Economics interface.  
In Posner’s view, the law and economics interface is 
pragmatic.  Posner writes:  
[W]hile pragmatist philosophers do not think that scientific theories 
can be shown to embody final truths about the structure of the 
 
 142 I.R.C. § 7443(e) (2011). 
 143 See generally Thomas D. Greenaway, Choice of Forum in Federal Civil Tax 
Litigation, 62 TAX LAW. 311 (2009) (discussing Tax Court operations). 
 144 See generally Andre L. Smith, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions of Law: 
Promoting Expertise, Uniformity, and Impartiality, 58 TAX LAW. 361 (2005).  
 145 Menard, Inc. v. Comm’r, 560 F.3d 620, 626 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Of particular 
importance to this case is the amount of risk in the compensation structure.”). 
 146 And so, for example, he refers to Easterbrook and Fischel’s text on the economic 
structure of corporate law. Id.; see generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).  Easterbrook’s and 
Fischel’s text has been critiqued by Kent Greenfield in “The Failure of Corporate Law.” 
See generally KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW (2006). 
 147 Richard Posner, From the New Institutional Economics to Organization 
Economics: With Applications to Corporate Governance, Government Agencies, and Legal 
Institutions, 6 J. INST. ECON. 1 (2010). 
 148 Id. at 2. 
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universe, they do not doubt the utility of such theories.  It is no more 
unpragmatic for judges to use economics to help them reach a decision 
than it is for them to use chemistry, the findings of cognitive 
psychology, or actuarial computation.149 
He goes on to say that his support for the Law and 
Economics interface is pragmatic and empiricist and that 
economic tools of analysis promote efficiency.150  Despite Posner’s 
disavowal of final truths and his focus on economics as merely 
one theory that informs the law, we think that Posner uses 
organization economics to the exclusion of other available 
organizational theories.  Alternatives to organization economics 
are available. 
What are these alternatives, and where might we find them?  
As an expert of new institutional economics and transaction cost 
economics, Oliver Williamson is mentioned in Posner’s 
organization economics article.151  Williamson himself, a 2009 
winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in economics, provides a 
survey of organization theory alternatives.152  Alternatives 
include resource dependence theory and the anthropological and 
symbolic perspectives. 
The first alternative is resource dependence theory as 
advocated by Jeffrey Pfeffer.153  In many ways, the predictions of 
resource dependence theory are similar to those of transaction 
cost economics.  However, as explained by Pfeffer, resource 
dependence theory emphasizes that (1) organizations and people 
within them are interdependent with other organizations and 
with other people; and (2) due to interdependence, understanding 
social context is critical.154  Hence, organizations and the people 
within them will seek relationships with others and be 
dependent upon others in order to obtain needed resources.  More 
specifically, a compensation structure results from a social 
comparison process.  According to Pfeffer, seniority has been 
shown to be more related to compensation than performance.155  
Furthermore, according to Pfeffer, “individuals prefer more equal 
distributions of wages or other organizational rewards than a 
principle of equity or proportionality implies, in which 
 
 149 RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 77 (2003). 
 150 Id. at 77–78. 
 151 Id. at 1–2. 
 152 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE 
PRESENT AND BEYOND 6 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995). 
 153 Jeffrey Pfeffer, Incentives in Organizations: The Importance of Social Relations, in 
ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 72, 72 
(Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 79. 
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individuals are compensated strictly in proportion to their 
performance . . . .”156  Resource dependence theory would 
probably de-emphasize a single test, such as the independent 
investor test, and instead emphasize the multiple factors of 
Mayson Manufacturing157 or Elliotts158 because such factors 
recognize interdependence and context.  Moreover, the emphasis 
upon interdependence and social context points to the importance 
of stare decisis.  As Posner himself explains, “the constraining 
effect of precedent comes not from the fact that stare decisis is a 
sound policy but from the fact that a judge’s influence is 
dependent to a significant degree on his decisions being treated 
as precedent by other judges.”159  In other words, the policy of 
stare decisis recognizes that organizations or institutions and the 
people within them are interdependent.   
More broadly, resource dependence theory points to the 
needs of the whole: the whole organization and the whole society.  
Consideration of the needs of the whole contrasts with 
“methodological individualism.”  As described by Mary Douglas, 
whose work is included among the organization theory 
alternatives,160 methodological individualism starts with the 
rational actor who is “sovereign over his own choices”; this 
contrasts with an anthropological perspective.161  As Douglas 
explains, methodological individualism ignores social influence.  
Douglas acknowledges Williamson’s theory of the firm, which is a 
“whole,” but Douglas points out that Williamson “has the same 
representative rational individual marching into one kind of 
contract or refusing to renew it . . . .”162  As an alternative to 
methodological individualism, Douglas proposes an 
anthropological argument: “What the individual is going to want 
is not entirely his own idea, but consists largely of a set of desires 
that the social environment inspires in him.”163  Douglas urges 
that dimensions of culture be included in theories of 
organizations and their actors.  The point is that, as an 
alternative to organization economics, Douglas’ anthropological 
perspective suggests that a single test, such as the independent 
 
 156 Id. at 85. 
 157 Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949). 
 158 Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1244–45 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 159 Posner, supra note 147, at 26–27. 
 160 Mary Douglas, Converging on Autonomy: Anthropology and Institutional 
Economics, in ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND 
BEYOND 98, 98 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995). 
 161 Id. at 100. 
 162 Id. at 102. 
 163 Id. 
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investor test, is inappropriate as it ignores a possible set of 
culturally influenced desires and constraints. 
Organization economics can be critiqued from yet another 
perspective: the non-rational, symbolic perspective.  Richard 
Scott, whose work is included in Williamson’s text, recognizes the 
“importance of economic incentives,” but he argues that stronger 
incentives are symbolic incentives.164  Briefly, he means that 
leadership is its own reward and that leaders manipulate 
symbols.165  Referring to the work of Chester Barnard, Scott says 
that symbols elicit commitment of organizational actors; 
organizational leaders, such as Mr. Menard, are rewarded by the 
commitment of the organizational actors.166  In addition, from 
Scott’s perspective, the independent investor test could be 
considered symbolic in this sense: “[S]ymbols also function in 
organizations to provide an externally devised cognitive 
framework, allowing conforming organizations to constitute 
themselves as rational actors, borrowing meaning and garnering 
legitimacy and support from their environment.”167  In the sense 
of an “externally devised cognitive framework,” return on equity 
becomes symbolic because a return on equity legitimizes 
compensation, even though return on equity would not 
necessarily justify compensation.168  
In sum, the preceding paragraphs have provided some 
examples of alternative organization theories.  More examples 
are possible.  The point is this: organization economics is merely 
one organization theory.  
V.  EXACTO SPRING CREATES MORE FODDER FOR CONFUSION 
THAN USING MULTIPLE OBJECTIVE FACTORS169 
The general formula for return on equity is income divided 
by equity.170  While application of return on equity may have 
 
 164 Richard Scott, Symbols & Organizations: From Barnard to the Institutionalists, in 
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 38, 
39–41 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995). 
 165 Id. at 40–42. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 51. 
 168 Id. at 49. 
 169 We are not alone in many of our opinions expressed in this section. See, e.g., 
Hathaway, supra note 12, at 924; Moran, supra note 4, at A-17–A-18.  Chodorow, supra 
note 128, notes that “any purported efficiency gains associated with using economics-
based tests may be illusory, especially where the test creates an overbroad and rebuttable 
presumption.” Chodorow, supra note 128, at 71.  Chodorow provides an excellent 
discussion of the conceptual fallacies (for example, assumption of bilateral monopoly) and 
practical difficulties (for example, future parties will likely manipulatively alter future 
behavior) inherent in the Exacto Spring approach. Id. at 89–102. 
 170 JOHN HUGHES, FRANCES AYRES & ROBERT HOSKIN, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: A 
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appeared straightforward in Exacto Spring, in actuality the 
formula is laden with questions ripe for argument.  Several cases 
have wrestled with these questions and arrived at no settled 
answers.171  
After Exacto Spring, parties in the Seventh Circuit have 
apparently perceived that their case will hinge upon return on 
equity.  In other circuits, parties have apparently perceived a 
material possibility their court will adopt the Exacto Spring 
approach and their case will hinge upon return on equity.172  
Consequently, cases have often veered into arcane economic 
questions with extensive, highly technical, and quite partisan 
expert testimony.  For example, in Brewer Quality Homes the 
Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit wrestled with the merits of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model and weighted average cost of capital; 
the Tax Court also grappled with whether an equity risk 
adjustment, size adjustment, and company-specific risk 
adjustment should be made to the risk-free rate of return.173  In 
Wechsler & Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, the Tax Court considered 
adjusting cost of common stock equity using a beta (measure of 
risk comparing a stock’s volatility to that of the general market) 
representing the median beta for six “smaller” publicly traded 
broker-dealers.174  In Menard, the Tax Court waded into issues of 
comparative proxy statement compensation, periodicity, transfer 
restrictions, vesting periods, risk of forfeiture, discount for 
aversion risk, Financial Accounting Standard 123, etc.175 
Among the issues that commonly arise when applying return 
on equity are the following: 
 
VALUATION EMPHASIS 174 (Mark Bonadeo et al. eds., 2005).  In practice, parties often 
modify the definition of income and equity to suit their purposes. Id.  
 171 Compare Metro Leasing & Dev. Corp. v. Comm’r., 376 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 
2004) (applying the multi-factors cited in prior cases), with Menard, Inc. v. Comm’r., 560 
F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying the Tax Court’s “independent investor” test). 
 172 See, e.g., Dexsil Corp. v. Comm’r., 147 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1998) (remanding 
decision for Tax Court’s failure to make a finding as to whether an independent investor 
would have approved the salary payments at issue); Labelgraphics, Inc. v. Comm’r., 221 
F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (“benchmarking an independent investor’s expectations” 
while applying five-factor analysis). 
 173 Brewer Quality Homes, Inc. v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 29, 34–44 (2003), aff’d, 
122 F. App’x 88 (5th Cir. 2004).  For example, for company-specific risk adjustment, the 
taxpayer’s expert argued for a negative 2.5% risk adjustment due to minimal business 
and financial risk, while the Service’s expert argued for a positive 5% risk adjustment due 
to the taxpayer’s size (as measured by annual sales), industry risks, lack of management 
depth, and the competitive nature of the taxpayer’s business. Id. at 34–38. 
 174 Wechsler & Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 138, 154 (2006). 
 175 Menard, Inc. v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 229, 239–43 (2004), rev’d, 560 F.3d 620 
(7th Cir. 2009).  The Tax Court also wrestled with several of these issues in Miller & Sons 
Drywall, Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1279, 1283–88 (2005), and Wechsler & 
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 138, 144–53 (2006). 
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First, which year(s)’ return on equity is relevant?  Return on 
equity for the year(s) at issue, the recent past, the officer’s 
tenure, or the corporation’s entire life?176  The answer is not clear 
and may differ among cases.177  A related question is whether to 
examine return on equity for each year separately or in the 
aggregate?178   
Second, what is “income?”  Should the parties use financial 
income per Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, taxable 
income, or income adjusted to better reflect economic reality?179  
Subtract taxes, interest cost, or cost of equity?  Use consolidated 
or unconsolidated income?  Use income per se or dividends plus 
stock appreciation?180 
Third, what is “equity?”  Should the parties use accounting 
book equity?  If yes, use initial capital contribution, beginning 
equity, ending equity, average equity, or equity otherwise 
determined?181  Include funds in form “borrowed” from the officer 
that are in substance capital contributions?182  What should be 
done if equity is negative?  
 
 176 For example, the Tax Court struggled with this issue in Miller & Sons Drywall, 89 
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1286–88. 
 177 Courts have focused primarily upon return on equity for the years at issue. See, 
e.g., B & D Found., Inc. v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 692, 707–10 (2001); Labelgraphics, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 518, 520–22 (1998), aff’d, 221 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2000).  
In H & A Int’l Jewelry, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 915, 922 (1997), the Tax 
Court noted: “Since a board makes its bonus decisions from year to year, return on equity 
may also be examined from year to year.  Thus, a strong return in 1 year does not 
guarantee board approval of bonuses in the next year, especially if there are financial 
reverses the second year.”  In B & D Foundation, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 709, the Tax Court 
noted that including a corporation’s initial years may skew average return on equity if the 
initial investment was relatively small.  The Ninth Circuit noted similarly in 
Labelgraphics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 221 F.3d 1091, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 178 This issue arose in Brewer Quality Homes v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 29, 
39–41 (2003), aff’d, 122 F. App’x 88 (5th Cir. 2004).  The most common practice is to use 
moving averages over a period of time. Bruce R. Ellig, Board Critical Issues in Executive 
Pay, in THE COMPENSATION HANDBOOK 433, 439–40 (5th ed. 2008).  
 179 This issue arose in Wechsler & Co., 92 T.C.M. (CCH) at 144–45. 
 180 Measuring stock appreciation entails valuing it at the beginning and end of the 
relevant period.  This imports into reasonable compensation cases all the valuation 
problems encountered when closely-held companies are valued for estate tax purposes. 
Chodorow, supra note 128, at 100. 
 181 Because return on equity pertains to a period of time (not an instant in time), 
using average equity over the period is conceptually most correct.  However, courts have 
not always followed this practice.  In Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241, 1247–
48 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit used end of year equity.  Whether beginning, ending 
or average equity is used can make a material difference.  In E.J. Harrison & Sons, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 240, 253 n.6 (2003), the Tax Court noted that using 
beginning, ending, and average book equity yielded 22%, 12.3% and 7.4% return on 
equity, respectively.   
 182 In M. & E. Shindler, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M (CCH) 3039, 3039-7 (1992), 
the Tax Court included funds “borrowed” from officers in equity.  In PMT, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 5, 13 (1996), the court noted the question of whether 
loans from officers should be included in equity. 
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Or should the parties use fair market value of company stock 
(beginning, ending, or average)?183  This value would better 
represent the opportunity cost of investment.184  However, it 
would render relevant everything from the macroeconomic 
environment to office furniture value, and would import an 
abundance of technical finance and economic questions.  For 
example, in Brewer Quality Homes, the Tax Court valued equity 
using fair market value; it wrestled for pages and pages with 
(1) whether to use three times “owners’ discretionary cash 
flow . . .” or five times “earnings before interest (net of interest 
income and interest expense) and taxes (Federal income taxes), 
or EBIT [Earnings Before Interest and Taxes],” and (2) how to 
determine the “cost of capital.”185 
Fourth, what is an acceptable return on equity?  In Brewer 
Quality Homes, the Tax Court looked to the “rate of return that 
an investor would expect to realize from an investment in a 
company such as the taxpayer, taking into account the 
appropriate risk and performance characteristics of the 
taxpayer.”186  This definition makes relevant everything about 
the taxpayer and its operational environment.  It also requires 
identification of comparable companies187 and raises many 
technical questions. 
Fifth, do the parties adjust for the taxpayer’s leverage?188  
Companies with high debt-to-equity ratios will experience 
heightened return on equity vis à vis companies with lower debt-
 
 183 E.J. Harrison, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) at 253 n.6. 
 184 In Metro Leasing & Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1644, 1650 
(2001), aff’d, 376 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2004), the taxpayer argued return on equity should 
focus on appreciation of assets, including unrealized appreciation of marketable securities 
and real estate.  The Tax Court noted both the difficulties of measuring appreciation and 
the questionable assumption of attributing appreciation to officer abilities and efforts. Id. 
 185 Brewer Quality Homes, Inc. v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 29, 43–46 (2003), aff’d, 
122 F. App’x 88 (5th Cir. 2004).  See generally William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A 
Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19(3) J. FIN. 425 (1964) 
(providing a model for calculating cost of capital (for example, discount rate) to use in firm 
valuation.  Its parameters are firm and market specific, which makes accurate estimation 
difficult and consensus regarding appropriate inputs unlikely); David W. Mullins, Jr., 
Does the Capital Asset Pricing Model Work?, 60 HARV. BUS. REV. 105, 105–13 (Jan.–Feb. 
1982). 
 186 Brewer Quality Homes, Inc. v. Comm’r., 86 T.C.M. 29, 44 (2003), aff’d, 122 F. 
App’x 88 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 187 See, e.g., Labelgraphics v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 518, 526–27 (1998), aff’d, 221 
F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2000).  See also Ted Buyniski & Marvin A. Mazer, Executive 
Compensation Strategy, in THE COMPENSATION HANDBOOK 311, 316–17 (5th ed. 2008) 
(offering guidance for peer group selection based on size, performance, business industry, 
and economics.  The authors acknowledge that for many firms discovering a peer group of 
reasonable size will be very difficult and ad hoc adjustments may be necessary.). 
 188 The Tax Court noted this issue in Foos v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 863, 
875–83 (1981). 
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to-equity ratios when times are good, but the reverse is also 
true.189 
Sixth, is it valid to assume that a satisfactory return on 
equity is primarily attributable to officer performance?190 
Seventh, if return on equity is unsatisfactory, do key officers 
receive no compensation?191 
Eighth, if a corporation has more than one key officer, does 
return on equity reveal the reasonableness of compensation 
among officers?192 
Finally, is return on equity the best measure of firm 
performance?193  Today, it is not necessarily viewed as the most 
conceptually sound measure of firm performance.194 
Although return on equity often enters into multiple 
objective factors analysis and so these issues could arise anyway, 
the Exacto Spring approach transmutes the issues into the crux 
of the case.  This transmutation makes parties more likely to 
bring out the heavy artillery of partisan experts who render 
highly technical and arcane testimony.  While parties often 
introduce expert testimony regarding multiple objective factors 
analysis, such testimony is typically less technical and is related 
to matters more within the typical judge’s realm of knowledge.   
Currently, parties have to address both approaches.  In 
circuits other than the Seventh, in the event the court follows 
Exacto Spring, parties must address return on equity.  In the 
Seventh Circuit, parties must address multiple objective factors 
 
 189 K. R. SUBRAMANYAM & JOHN J. WILD, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS 463–65 
(10th ed. 2009).  
 190 Haffner’s Serv. Stations, Inc. v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1211, 1223 n.15 (2002), 
aff’d, 326 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003).  In the one case we located in which the taxpayer argued 
it overpaid its officers (and hence part of what it originally characterized as compensation 
was unreasonable), the taxpayer was quick to argue that its excellent financial 
performance was mostly attributable to a fortuitous regional boom in its industry 
(construction) and the hard work of other employees. Summit Sheet Metal Co. v. Comm’r, 
72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1606, 1610–12 (1996).  
 191 The Ninth Circuit in Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241, 1247 n.5 (9th 
Cir. 1983), notes that occasionally compensation may be reasonable even if return on 
equity is unsatisfactory or even negative. 
 192 The Tax Court noted this issue on remand in E.J. Harrison & Sons, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1301, 1303 (2006), aff’d, 270 F. App’x 667 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 193 In E.J. Harrison, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 240, 253 n.6 (2003), the Tax Court noted that, 
because the taxpayer’s equity had remained essentially constant while its sales and assets 
increased, return on assets or return on sales would likely be a superior measure of 
performance in that case.   
 194 The most contemporary measure of investment performance is Economic Value 
Added.  Economic value added = after-tax operating profit – [(total assets – current 
liabilities) * weighted average cost of capital]. STEVEN R. JACKSON, ROBY B. SAWYERS & J. 
GREGORY JENKINS, MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING: A FOCUS ON ETHICAL DECISION MAKING 
417–18 (Rob Dewey ed., 5th ed. 2009). 
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analysis in case the court holds the taxpayer’s return on equity 
was unsatisfactory or was not attributable solely to officer(s).  
Finally, the Service has other weapons available to disallow 
unreasonable compensation.  For example, the Service could use 
the section 162 “ordinary and necessary” provision, section 482, 
or the substance over form doctrine.195  All of these generate 
messy facts and circumstances battles.  What is to prevent the 
Service from using these weapons if courts adopt the Exacto 
Spring approach? 
VI.  OUR THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS 
A. Appellate Courts Should Review Trial Courts’ Selection of 
Relevant Reasonable Compensation Factors Using a Clearly 
Erroneous Standard 
At the appellate level, trial courts’ factual findings are 
properly overturned only if “clearly erroneous”; their legal 
conclusions are properly reviewed without deference (that is, de 
novo).196  However, there is not simply a continuum of issues 
ranging from purely factual to purely legal.  For example, 
“evaluative determinations” have no home in such a 
continuum.197 
“Reasonable” issues, including the reasonable compensation 
issue, are evaluative determinations; such issues are not properly 
 
 195 Although cases have held I.R.C. § 482 does not apply in the context of a 
corporation and an employee working solely for that corporation, Foglesong v. 
Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982), the I.R.C. § 482 regulations were 
subsequently amended to provide “[e]mployment for compensation will constitute a 
separate trade or business from the employing trade or business.” Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
1(i)(2) (2011).  See also COLE, supra note 114, at § 2.04, n.12. 
 196 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). 
 197 Randall H. Warner, All Mixed up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 101, 104–09 (2005).  The article provides the following examples of evaluative 
determinations. 
For example, in a negligence case involving stipulated historical facts—that is, 
the parties agree about what happened, but disagree about whether the 
defendant’s conduct was reasonable—the jury’s reasonableness determination 
is neither factual nor legal.  It is not deciding what happened, since that is 
stipulated.  And it is not deciding rules that apply for all similarly situated 
people.  It is just deciding whether one person’s conduct was reasonable in a 
specific circumstance. 
Similarly, a jury’s decision to award $1 million in damages for pain and 
suffering is neither fact nor law, nor anything in between.  It is a different kind 
of decision altogether, one in which the jury is neither determining what 
happened (a question of fact) nor fixing a generally applicable rule (a question 
of law), but is prescribing the appropriate result in one specific case. 
Id. at 108.  As noted by the article, evaluative determinations are found everywhere in the 
law (for example, negligence in tort law and probable cause in criminal procedure). 
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always reviewed deferentially or de novo.198  Rather, their 
standard of review is based on a policy choice concerning the 
judicial actor better positioned to decide the particular issue.199 
Appellate courts have treated composition of the factors used 
to determine reasonable compensation as a legal question 
reviewable de novo.200  Nevertheless, they have treated 
determination of the ultimate fact of the amount of reasonable 
compensation as a factual question reviewable only for clear 
error.201  This disparate treatment seems logically inconsistent.  
By deferring to trial courts’ determination of the amount of 
reasonable compensation, appellate courts implicitly 
acknowledge that trial courts are better positioned to make this 
evaluative determination.  If trial courts are better positioned to 
determine the amount of reasonable compensation, surely they 
are also better positioned to select the factors relevant to such 
determination. 
Further, appellate courts already show deference to trial 
courts’ weighting of reasonable compensation factors differently 
in different cases, but there is no logical distinction between 
determining that a given factor will receive a very high or very 
low weight in different cases and determining that the factor is 
relevant in some cases and irrelevant in other cases.202 
In sum, trial courts are better positioned to select relevant 
reasonable compensation factors.  Such selection is integral to 
determining the amount of reasonable compensation, an 
inherently factual determination that appellate courts concede is 
properly the province of trial courts.  Thus, appellate courts 
should overrule trial courts’ selection of relevant reasonable 
compensation factors only if it leads to clearly erroneous 
determination of ultimate fact (the amount of reasonable 
compensation). 
B. A Few Additional Thoughts 
We believe it unlikely that an independent company owner 
would agree to a contract embodying the Exacto Spring approach.  
Such a contract would allow the officer to draw out any amount 
 
 198 Warner, supra note 197, at 130. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Dexsil Corp. v. Comm’r, 147 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 201 Labelgraphics, Inc. v. Comm’r, 221 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 202 See, e.g., Leonard Pipeline Contractors, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 142 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (“Despite the difficulties of determining what is reasonable compensation, it is 
the obligation of the Tax Court to spell out its reasoning and to do more than enumerate 
the factors and leap to a figure intermediate between petitioner’s and the 
Commissioner’s.”). 
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of compensation, no matter how high, as long as return on equity 
is left at a certain minimal level.  
More likely, an officer and independent company owner 
would agree as follows.203  First, the officer will receive minimal 
fixed compensation, even if pre-compensation net income is 
negative.  Next, if net income (after officer minimal fixed 
compensation) is positive, the company owner will receive a 
minimal return on their invested capital.  If net income exceeds 
that needed to provide the minimal return on owner invested 
capital, the officer and company owner will share the “bounty.”204  
Under the Exacto Spring approach, all the bounty would be 
allocated to the officer.  While profit sharing plans entitling 
management to a share of the bounty are common, we are aware 
of no independent company owner agreeing to a compensation 
plan granting management most, much less all, of it.205 
Allocating all the bounty to the officer implicitly presumes 
that only the officer could have steered the taxpayer to a 
bountiful performance.206  We believe this is an erroneous 
presumption of bilateral monopoly.207  Occasionally, the officer 
 
 203 To accord with real world business practice, contingent compensation formulas 
must be agreed to before the period in question.  Likewise, Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(2) 
provides that to be reasonable contingent compensation it must represent a “free bargain 
between the employer and the individual made before the services are rendered” Treas. 
Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(2) (2011) (emphasis added).  However, Exacto Spring does not appear to 
limit its attempted coinage of the return on equity approach to ex ante compensation 
formulas.  
 204 CEO cash bonus compensation is on average seventy-five percent of base salary.  
Lower executive bonus compensation is significantly less than fifty percent and declines 
as one moves down the organization chart. Amuso & Knopping, supra note 126, at 212. 
 205 See generally Robert Masternak, Gainsharing or Profit Sharing, in THE 
COMPENSATION HANDBOOK 277 (5th ed. 2008). 
 206 The Tax Court noted in PMT, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 5, 28 (1996), 
that this assumption is likely not valid. 
 207 Chodorow, supra note 128, at 97, notes the Seventh Circuit may have erroneously 
grounded Exacto Spring upon the assumption of a bilateral monopoly and states as 
follows: 
While it might theoretically be reasonable for an investor to pay 100 percent of 
profits above his expected return to an executive if he has no other means of 
obtaining his expected return, the market drives down the price an investor 
has to pay.  It would be unreasonable for an investor seeking to maximize his 
wealth to pay 100 percent of those excess profits to one executive, if another 
would agree to take only fifty percent.  Even if this second executive were to 
generate a smaller gross return than the first, if his share of the profits is 
small enough, the investor will still be better off by hiring the second executive.  
Thus, the premise that a hypothetical reasonable investor would agree to pay 
an above-market salary may be faulty, and the conclusion that an 
employee/owner’s salary was reasonable because it fell within the range 
predicted by a model that eliminates the market may not be warranted. 
The Tax Court noted in Guy Schoenecker, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303, 
1312 (1995), that while “it is difficult to determine what an independent investor would 
expect from the risk of his funds in a business such as [the taxpayer’s] . . . it is reasonable 
to assume that an independent investor would be unwilling for an officer to realize 
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may have technical expertise, supplier and customer 
relationships, or the like, without which the taxpayer simply 
could not function.  But usually the taxpayer could function 
without the officer.  Pre-compensation net income might be lower 
without the officer, but such diminution could potentially be 
more than offset by reduced salary cost.208 
If the bounty is attributable to intangibles (on or off the 
balance sheet), its division would depend upon who owns or 
controls the intangibles.  For example, if certain customers would 
cease purchasing from the company if the officer left, this 
“customer list” intangible would provide the officer with 
bargaining leverage to obtain a larger share of the bounty. 
Courts have occasionally allowed compensation to be 
increased for the value of intangibles such as customer lists, 
unique processes, etc.209  Issues frequently skipped include: (1) 
who owns or controls the intangibles,210 and (2) whether the 
intangibles would have value if the officer left the corporation.  In 
our view, if a corporation uses intangibles owned or controlled by 
an officer, the officer should receive more of the bounty.  
However, if the corporation owns or controls intangibles that 
would remain valuable if the officer were absent, the corporation 
should receive more of the bounty.211 
C. A Few Suggestions 
Additional regulatory guidance would better protect closely-
held corporations from uncertainty regarding reasonable 
compensation than would adoption of the Exacto Spring 
approach.  Such regulations could prescribe, inter alia, 
methodological guidance similar to the section 482 regulations,212 
 
compensation out of line with compensation paid by similar businesses, thus 
unnecessarily reducing the income produced by the business in which he had invested.” 
 208 The section 162 regulations implicitly acknowledge the ability of market 
competition to drive down compensation stating “[i]t is, in general, just to assume that 
reasonable and true compensation is only such amount as would ordinarily be paid for 
like services by like enterprises under like circumstances.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-7(b)(3) 
(2011). 
 209 See, e.g., Beiner, Inc. v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 297, 307–08 (2004); Mortex Mfg. 
Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2412, 2422 (1994). 
 210 If an officer previously developed intangibles but was not adequately compensated 
therefore, this raises a pay for past services issue.  Compensation intended to compensate 
an officer for previous under-compensation can be “reasonable.” Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush 
Co., 281 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1930).  However, the taxpayer must establish (1) the 
insufficiency of the officer’s compensation in the previous year(s), and (2) the amount of 
the current year’s compensation intended as compensation for that underpayment. Pacific 
Grains, Inc. v. Comm’r, 399 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 211 Regardless of who owns or controls intangibles, if they increase corporate earnings 
then compensation tied to earnings will also increase.   
 212 The arm’s length transaction standard of I.R.C. § 482 has a “close analytic 
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mandatory documentation regarding the taxpayer’s method of 
determining compensation,213 and procedures for pre-filing 
agreements regarding reasonable compensation.214  
The impact of intangibles on reasonable compensation also 
warrants additional regulatory guidance.215  We believe courts 
should more deliberately identify and address the impact of 
intangibles on reasonable compensation.  However, valuing 
intangibles entails thorny measurement questions.  For example, 
many intangibles are inextricably tied to other intangible or 
tangible assets, making disaggregated valuation exceedingly 
difficult.216  This valuation issue is likely one reason firms with 
high amounts of intangibles are more likely to use bonus 
structures with earnings rather than return based 
benchmarks.217  However, crafting of useful intangible valuation 
guidance is possible.218 
CONCLUSION 
Courts have been reluctant to follow Exacto Spring’s return 
on equity approach in reasonable compensation cases.219  We 
agree with their reluctance.  Multiple objective factors analysis 
better accords with section 162, better implements applicable 
regulations, is more consonant with collective judicial wisdom, 
 
kinship” to the reasonable compensation issue. Stumpff, supra note 1, at 398 n.80.  In 
Miller & Sons Drywall, Inc. v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1279, 1282 (2005), a reasonable 
compensation case, the Tax Court characterized its task as deciding “whether the amount 
of compensation paid to petitioner’s shareholder-employees would have been the same 
had they engaged in an arm’s-length negotiation.”  The I.R.C. § 482 regulations look to 
comparable transactions rather than economic theory to determine whether transactions 
between related parties satisfy the arm’s length standard. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (2011).   
 213 See COLE, supra note 114, at ch. 20 for a discussion of transfer pricing 
documentation requirements. 
 214 See COLE, supra note 114, at ch. 19 for a discussion of transfer pricing Advance 
Pricing Agreements. 
 215 In Normandie Metal Fabricators v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1738, 1747 
(2000), the Service’s expert testified “it is misleading to measure return on equity based 
on a shareholder’s nominal investment in the company because the shareholder may have 
invested capital or sweat equity and the company may have contributed patents, 
intellectual property, or other intangibles that do not appear on the balance sheet.”  Thus, 
he testified, “the rate of return on equity is best measured by comparing the company’s 
operating return to the fair market value of its operating assets [including intangibles not 
appearing on the taxpayer’s balance sheet].” Id. 
 216 For example, Coca-Cola’s brand name and secret formula are seemingly 
inseparable as distinct assets.  When the company tried to use the same brand name with 
a different formula in the 1980s, sales plummeted and brand value was damaged until the 
company resumed with the “Classic” formula and eventually cancelled production of “New 
Coke.” 
 217 Debra L. Krolick, The Relevance of Financial Statement Information for Executive 
Performance Evaluation: Evidence from Choice of Bonus Plan Accounting Performance 
Measures, 40 INT’L J. ACCT. 115, 125–30 (2005).   
 218 See ALFRED M. KING, FAIR VALUE FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING ch. 6 (2006).  
 219 Behrens, supra note12, at 801–02. 
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and is more attuned to the manner in which unrelated parties 
actually determine compensation.  A likely more efficacious 
approach to lessening taxpayer uncertainty regarding reasonable 
compensation would be issuance of additional regulatory 
guidance, including methodological guidance (especially 
regarding intangibles), documentation guidance, and pre-filing 
agreement procedures. 
 
